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ARGUMENT 
I. The Arbitration Award Should Be Set Aside Because the 
Arbitrator Relied on Fraudulent Evidence of the Fair 
Market Value of the Subject Property. 
Arbitration is a speedy and inexpensive method of 
resolving disputes. Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v. 
Fake, 740 P. 2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) (citing Robinson & Wells. 
P. C. v. Warren. 669 P. 2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983)). As a general 
rule, however, an arbitration award may be set aside for fraud, 
improper conduct or unfair means used in procuring the award. 
See Teal v. Bilbv. 123 U.S. 572 (1887) (fraudulent concealment 
of facts); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, What Constitutes 
Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means in Obtaining Arbitration Award 
Justifying Avoidance of Award Under State Law, 22 A. L. R. 4th 
366, 377-81 (1983). In the present case, the arbitration award 
cannot stand because the proceeding was not fair and honest and 
because the substantial rights of the parties have not been 
respected. See Utility Trailer, 740 P. 2d at 1329. 
In his Appellee' s Brief, Mintz argues that Marc 
Development somehow waived its right to challenge the 
arbitrator' s decision by failing to file a motion to set aside 
the award within twenty days after the award was issued. (Mintz 
Brief p. 12) The basis for Marc Development's motion to set the 
award aside, however, was new information that the award had 
been procured through fraud. 
A. Marc Development Moved to Set Aside the 
Arbitration Award Within the Statutory 
Limitations Period. 
The Utah Arbitration Act establishes the time frame 
within which a motion to vacate an award must be filed. In 
pertinent part, the Act provides: 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any 
party to the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall 
vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by 
corruption, fraud, or other undue 
means; 
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall 
be made to the court within 20 days after a 
copy of the award is served upon the moving 
party, or if predicated upon corruption, 
fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days 
after the grounds are known or should have 
been known. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14 (1992) (emphasis supplied). 
Marc Development discovered that the arbitration 
proceeding was defective shortly after Mintz filed his Motion 
for Judgment on the Pleadings. Marc Development filed its 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Objection 
to Judgment on the Pleadings on February 4, 1992, well within 
the limitations period imposed by § 78-31a-14(2). (See R. 36-
64) 
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B. Marc Development has Marshalled the Evidence 
Demonstrating that the Case Should Be Remanded 
for Further Proceedings. 
Mintz argues that Marc Development has failed to 
marshal any evidence in support of its claims. (Mintz Brief 
p. 16) This argument is without any substance because the trial 
court refused to allow Marc Development an opportunity to 
present evidence in support of its claim of fraud. The essence 
of Marc Development' s argument is that the trial court refused 
to grant an opportunity for Marc Development to establish these 
critical facts on the record. 
The record is clear, however, that Marc development 
presented new evidence suggesting that the arbitration award had 
been procured through fraud. (R. 3 6-77) The record is equally 
clear that the trial court refused to hear this evidence. 
(R. 122-60) 
The trial court' s summary disposition of this matter 
placed Marc Development in the same position of a litigant 
opposing a motion for summary judgment before discovery was 
commenced. Marc Development had only recently learned of facts 
that indicated the arbitrator' s award was defective. After 
Mintz brought his action to confirm the award, Marc Development 
was forced to present all available evidence to the court. 
After raising these material issues, Marc Development should 
have been allowed to complete its investigation of the facts and 
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to present the results of that investigation to the court. The 
Utah Arbitration Act was never intended to foreclose all 
possibility of discovery to confirm or disprove whether an 
arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other 
undue means. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1). 
C. Marc Development Presented Evidence That the 
Arbitration Award Had Been Procured Through 
Fraud. 
An arbitral award will not be enforced if it was 
procured by fraud or coercion. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-
14(l)(a); Office and Professional Employees International Union, 
Local 2 v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 724 
F. 2d 133 (D. C. Cir. 1983). The burden of showing fraud 
sufficient to set aside an arbitration award is on the party 
seeking to set the award aside. Keen v. IFG Leasing Co. . 622 
P. 2d 861 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). The party bearing this burden 
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration 
award was obtained by fraud. Hot Springs County School District 
No. 1 v. Strube Const. Co. . 715 P. 2d 540 (Wyo. 1986). It is 
axiomatic that clear and convincing evidence cannot be presented 
without an opportunity to conduct discovery or to examine live 
witnesses. 
As set forth in its Memorandum in Support of its 
Objection to Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 36-64), Marc 
Development learned that on at least two occasions, Mintz 
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solicited bids from individuals on the subject property at 
prices substantially below fair market value and offered to 
"split the difference" with the bidding individual between the 
offered purchase price and the guarantee. The arbitration award 
was defective because the arbitrator actually relied on this 
false and deceptive evidence to establish the value of the 
subject property. (See R. 53, 58) Marc Development also 
learned that Mintz may have been involved in a scheme to tie up 
assets of Marc Development so that the subject property could 
not be repurchased from Mintz. All of these events were 
discovered after the arbitrator' s award had been entered. 
Mintz argues that there is no evidence in the record 
to support Marc Development' s claim of fraud. (Mintz Brief 
p. 17) Marc Development did, however, present evidence that the 
arbitrator' s award had been procured by the submission of 
deceptive and defective evidence and that Mintz failed to fairly 
and accurately represent the purported offer of $400,000.00 for 
the subject property. 
In reviewing the granting of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, the facts and all inferences are reviewed in the 
light most favorable to Marc Development. See Young v. Texas 
Co. , 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P. 2d 1099, 1100 (1958). For purposes of 
appellate review, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
treated as a motion for summary judgment where matters outside 
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the pleadings have been presented and not excluded by the court. 
Id.; see also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) 
("Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly 
presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the 
facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party 
opposing the summary judgment."). 
The record reveals that on February 4, 1992, Marc 
Development filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of its Objection to Judgment on the Pleadings. 
(R. 36-64) The Memorandum was supported by the Affidavit of 
Mark Kaplan (R. 65-73) and the Affidavit of Jon Olch. (R. 74-77) 
The Kaplan Affidavit established that on at least two separate 
occasions, Mintz solicited bids on the subject property at 
prices substantially below the fair market value of the 
property. (R. 71) Mintz sought bids from Peter Arnold and 
James Schwartz and offered to "split the difference" with the 
bidding party between the offered price and the guarantee. (R. 
71) The Kaplan Affidavit also established that Mintz had listed 
the subject property for sale for $588,500.00 but had refused to 
sell it to Marc Development in order to satisfy the guarantee. 
(R. 71) 
The Affidavit of Jon Olch established that Mintz 
listed and sold the subject property for an amount significantly 
greater than the value attributed to the property by the 
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arbitrator. Olch is a licensed real estate agent employed with 
Prudential Coleman Real Estate, the selling broker for the 
subject property. (R. 74) The Olch Affidavit established that 
Mintz had entered into a binding sale agreement with Mr. and 
Mrs. Carmela J. Santoro, as Trustees of the Santoro Family 
Trust, for the purchase and sale of the subject property for 
$570,000,000. (R. 75) The property was listed at $588,500.00 
and the buyer originally offered $560,000.00 for the property. 
(R. 75) 
In order to defeat the motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, Marc Development was required only to present 
evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the 
arbitration award had been procured through fraud. The Kaplan 
and Olch Affidavits raised issues of fact which, if proved, 
would serve as a basis for setting the arbitration award aside. 
Marc Development was never allowed an opportunity to prove these 
facts or even to conduct a complete investigation into the 
matter. Because the evidence went to the very heart of the 
arbitrator' s ruling, the trial court erred in refusing to allow 
Marc Development an opportunity to present this evidence at an 
evidentiary hearing. 
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D. Marc Development Was Denied a Meaningful 
Opportunity to Present Evidence that the 
Arbitration Award Was Defective. 
Marc Development filed a request for oral argument on 
February 28, 1992. (R. 115-6) The trial court, however, 
refused this request and granted Mintz' s motion for judgment on 
the pleadings in a minute entry dated March 24, 1992. (R. 152) 
The trial court entered its formal Order and Judgment confirming 
the arbitration award on March 25, 1992. (R. 153-6) The trial 
court entered an Order and Supplemental Judgment on March 2 5, 
1992 awarding attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 157-60) Marc 
Development was never allowed an opportunity to present its 
argument and evidence to the court. 
The Kaplan and Olch Affidavits were offered to show 
only that the arbitration award should not be confirmed because 
the award had been procured through fraud. An offer to show 
fraud in attacking arbitration award should indicate facts 
which, if proved, would be sufficient to sustain such a finding. 
Parking Unlimited, Inc. v. Monsour Medical Foundation. 445 A. 2d 
758, 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). The Affidavits indicated the 
existence of material issues of disputed facts. The Affidavits 
themselves were never intended to be a substitute for live 
testimony. The trial court should have granted an evidentiary 
hearing to allow Marc Development to call live witnesses, such 
as Mintz, Peter Arnold and James Schwartz, to conclusively 
-8-
establish or disprove these facts. See Malibu Pools of New 
Mexico. Inc. v. Harvard. 637 P. 2d 537 (N. M. 1981) (trial court 
erred in refusing to hear evidence of arbitration panel' s 
alleged misconduct for failure to hear evidence). Only after 
hearing this evidence, the trial court could then confirm or set 
aside the arbitration award. To confirm the award without 
hearing the evidence, however, frustrates the essential purposes 
of arbitration. 
An evidentiary hearing would not, of course, be for 
the purpose of retrying the issues before the arbitrator. The 
hearing would be for the sole purpose of determining whether the 
arbitration award was defective because of the reliance by the 
arbitrator on false and deceptive evidence. 
The trial court erred in granting the motion for 
judgment on the pleadings because the Kaplan and Olch Affidavits 
submitted in opposition to the motion created a material issue 
of fact as to whether Mintz obtained the arbitration award 
through fraud. See American Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 
751 P. 2d 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Mintz offered no evidence to 
rebut these affidavits. The trial court erred in failing to 
hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Marc Development to call 
live witnesses to establish these facts. 
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E. The Trial Court Failed to Enter a Written 
Statement of the Ground for its Decision as 
Required bv Rule 52. 
Because the confirmation of the arbitration award had 
the same effect as the grant of a motion for summary judgment 
under Rule 5 6, the trial court was required to enter a written 
statement of the ground for its decision in accordance with Rule 
52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Clawson v. Habilitat. Inc. . 
783 P. 2d 1230 (Hawaii 1989) (findings of fact and conclusions of 
law should be entered by the trial court on motions to vacate 
arbitration awards); Utah R. Civ. P. 52. Without a statement of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court is unable to 
determine whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to 
vacate. See Clawson, 783 P. 2d at 1232. Indeed, this Court is 
unable even to determine whether the trial court was aware of 
the new evidence presented by Marc Development. 
In pertinent part, Rule 52 states as follows: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon 
the facts without a jury or with an advisory 
jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A 
. . . . The trial court need not enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
ruling on motions, except as provided in 
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue 
a brief written statement of the ground for 
its decision on all motions granted under 
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
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Because Marc Development raised issues of fact outside 
the pleadings, the motion to confirm the arbitration award is 
viewed as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Young v. 
Texas Co. , 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P. 2d 1099, 1100 (1958). The trial 
court failed to enter a written statement of the ground for its 
decision. This failure is critical because it effectively 
denies Marc Development of the right to seek meaningful judicial 
review of the trial court' s decision. 
II. Mintz Has Obtained a Double Recovery as a Result of 
the Arbitration Award. 
After persuading the arbitrator that the fair market 
value of the subject property was only $400,000.00, Mintz listed 
the subject property for sale at $588,500.00. (R. 75) Mintz 
ultimately accepted an offer of $570,000.00 for the property. 
(R. 75) Mintz now seeks to again recover the difference between 
the $400,000.00 value established by the arbitrator and the 
$588,500.00 guarantee. Mintz has already been compensated for 
any loss suffered and to permit the enforcement of the 
arbitration award would result in an improper windfall to Mintz. 
See Briaham City Sand & Gravel Machinery Center. Inc. . 613 P. 2d 
510, 511 (Utah 1980) (a party may not obtain a double recovery 
for the same loss). 
Evidence of the actual sales price of the subject 
property is important only as it relates to the arbitration 
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award. The listing of the subject property at the guarantee and 
the eventual sale of the property for less than four percent 
under the listing price serve to demonstrate that the arbitrator 
relied on defective evidence in fixing the value of the property 
at $400,000.00. Marc Development has explained how the 
arbitrator was misled by false evidence manufactured by Mintz in 
an attempt to deceive the arbitrator. 
III. The District Court Should Determine the Actual Amount 
of Damages Suffered bv Mintz. 
As it presently stands, the arbitration award allows 
Mintz $188,500.00 in damages plus interest and fees. This 
amount represents the guaranteed price of $588,500.00 less the 
$400,000.00 "fair market value" of the property as determined by 
the arbitrator. The evidence, however, shows that Mintz may 
have suffered as little as $18,500.00 in actual damages after 
the subject property was sold. The actual damages are 
calculated by subtracting the $570,000,00 actual sales price of 
the subject property from the $588,500.00 guarantee price. 
Because of the obvious and wide discrepancy between the actual 
damages suffered by Mintz and the amount of the arbitration 
award, the case should be remanded to the district court for a 
determination of the actual damages suffered by Mintz. 
The actual damages suffered by Mintz were established 
during January, 1992 when Mintz agreed to sell the subject 
property for $570,000.00. (See R. 75) Thus, the actual damages 
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suffered by Mintz were established within eight months of the 
arbitration award and before the award was confirmed by the 
district court. 
Because the subject property has been sold, and the 
amount of the damages actually suffered by Mintz can be fixed 
with precision, the district court should hear evidence of the 
actual damages suffered by Mintz. The amount of damages awarded 
by the arbitrator were based upon inaccurate estimates and 
conjecture as to the actual value of the property. To allow the 
arbitration award to stand would ignore the realities of the 
case and would unfairly penalize Marc Development. Conversely, 
a redetermination of the damages actually suffered by Mintz 
would fairly compensate Mintz and would preserve the essential 
determination of the arbitrator. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Marc Development respectfully 
requests that the decision of the district court be reversed and 
the case remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary 
hearing to allow Marc Development to present evidence on its 
claim that the arbitration award was procured through the use of 
fraudulent evidence and to determine the exact nature and extent 
-13-
of the damages suffered by Mintz. 
DATED this Z/7/^ day of November, 1992. 
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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